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Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze
Richard Kimberly Heck
With the publication of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, mathematical logic was born.
Of course, as George Boolos (1998) has emphasized, it is not as if no signi-
ficant contributions were made to the subject beforehand. But it is only in
1879 that it becomes possible to subject everyday mathematical concepts and
arguments to logical analysis. Unsuprisingly, however, the magnitude of what
Frege had done was not immediately apparent to his contemporaries. Ernst
Schröder (1972), for example, argued in his review of Begriffsschrift that Frege
had simply replicated the work of the Boolean school—of which Schröder
just happened to be the leading German member—in a new and excessively
cumbersome notation. In a series of papers written over the next few years,
therefore, Frege attempted to explain the significance of his new notation for
generality by showing how it could be put to work in the analysis of mathem-
atical argumentation.
Logicians were at least paying attention. Philosophers, it would seem, were
not, although Frege believed from the outset that his work should be of interest
to them as well (Frege, 1879a, 7). He submitted several papers to philosoph-
ical journals in 1881 and 1882, but only one of these was published: a short
piece explaining what need the concept-script was meant to satisfy (Frege,
1882b). And so it was that, in 1882, Frege wrote a letter, apparently to the
philosopher Anton Marty, outlining some of the philosophical implications
of Frege’s work and askingMarty to mention it in his own, so that Frege might
gain access to philosophical journals. A few weeks later, Frege received a reply
from Carl Stumpf, then a colleague of Marty’s at Prague. Frege’s original let-
ter may actually have been addressed to Stumpf; it is possible that Stumpf
responded on behalf of Marty; it is possible that Frege had also written a sim-
ilar letter to Stumpf. We shall probably never know, but it does not matter for
our purposes.What does matter is that Stumpf ’s letter contains, as SirMichael
Dummett once put it,1 one of the best pieces of advice ever given.
Frege had written:
1I believe I heard Dummett make this remark in lectures on Die Grundlagen that he gave in
Oxford in Trinity Term 1989, but I am not sure, and I may well have the date wrong.
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I have now nearly completed a book in which I treat the concept of number and
demonstrate that the first principles of computation, which up to now have generally
been regarded as unprovable axioms, can be proved from definitions bymeans of logical
laws alone, so that they may have to be regarded as analytic judgements in Kant’s sense.
(Frege, 1980, 99–100)
One might suspect that the book to which Frege refers is what became Die
Grundlagen der Arithmetik, but the larger context2 makes it clear that this
book was in the style of Begriffsschrift, in which Frege had already announced
his intention “to provide a more detailed analysis of the concepts of arithmetic
and a deeper foundation for its theorems” (Frege, 1879a, 8). And that is how
Stumpf understood Frege. In reply, he suggested that Frege should not seek
to publish more of his formal work right away, since that was unlikely to
get the attention of philosophers, but should instead “explain [his] line of
thought first in ordinary language and then—perhaps separately on another
occasion or in the very same book—in concept-script…” (Frege, 1980, 172).
Frege seems to have taken Stumpf ’s advice, and the result was Die Grundlagen,
which was published two years later.
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that it should be a full nine years
after the publication of Die Grundlagen before Grundgesetze der Arithmetik
would appear. Frege addresses the question why there was such a long delay in
the Foreword to Grundgesetze. One thing he mentions is the “cool reception”
accorded his writings, which left him discouraged (Grundgesetze I, xi) and, to
be blunt, bitter. The other reason he mentions is more substantial:
The reason why the implementation appears so long after the announcement is owing
in part to internal changes within the concept-script which forced me to jettison a
nearly completed handwritten work. (Grundgesetze I, ix)
Frege goes on to mention several such improvements. Among them are his
adoption of the view that arithmetical equality is simply identity of numbers
and the consequent adoption of ‘=’ as the sign for identity in place of ‘’.
There are also differences in how some of the common symbols are interpreted:
What was called the ‘content-stroke’ in Begriffsschrift is called the ‘horizontal’
in Grundgesetze, and it is treated as a unary truth-function in the latter book,
whereas its status in Begriffsschrift is quite unclear. The introduction of value-
ranges allowed Frege to simplify many of his definitions, and he emphasizes
that value-ranges also “have a much more fundamental importance” (Grund-
gesetze I, ix–x), due to the role they play in the definition of cardinal num-
bers. The introduction of truth-values and the related distinction, within a
“possible content of judgement”, between the thought judged to be true and
its truth-value is said to make everything “much simpler and more precise”
(Grundgesetze I, x). And finally, Frege remarks that “the nature of functions,
2In particular, Frege remarks that his “confidence” in his result “is based on the application of
[his] concept-script” (Frege, 1980, 100). Note also Frege’s remark, in the Preface to Begriffsschrift,
that “elucidat[ing] the concepts of number, magnitude, and so forth…will be the object of further
investigations, which I shall publish immediately after this booklet” (Frege, 1879a, 8).
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in contrast to objects, is characterised more precisely” in Grundgesetze than it
had been in Begriffsschrift (Grundgesetze I, x).
Here’s what I would like to understand: How, and in response to what
pressures, Frege’s logical doctrines evolve between Begriffsschrift and Grund-
gesetze. I propose to approach this question by exploring how the differences
we have just reviewed might have affected Frege’s attempts to derive the basic
laws of arithmetic within logic. Why would those changes have forced him
to abandon the work he had already “nearly completed” in 1882 and to start
afresh? If this was, indeed, why it took Frege so long to complete Grundge-
setze, that cannot have been an easy decision for him but must have been one
to which he felt forced.
To understand why Frege abandoned his earlier work, however, we need to
have some sense of what that work was like. And since most of Frege’s Nachlass
is now lost,3 we have no choice but to speculate. Admittedly, the speculation
will become quite wild at times, but it will remain grounded in what we do
know. And, as it happens, there is something to be learned from the attempt
to discern, through what clues we have, what Frege’s earliest attempts to derive
the basic laws of arithmetic might have been like, even if a definitive answer
is not likely to be had.
18.1 FIRST- AND SECOND-LEVEL EXTENSIONS
The explicit definition of number that Frege gives in Die Grundlagen is very
similar to the one he gives in Grundgesetze, but there is an oft-mentioned
difference between them. In the earlier work, the definition reads (Frege, 1884,
§68):
The Number that belongs to the concept F is the extension of the con-
cept “[concept that is] equinumerous with the concept F ”.
Presented in the same informal style, the later definition is:
The Number that belongs to the extension of the concept F is the exten-
sion of the concept “extension that is equinumerous with the extension
of the concept F ”.
In both cases, numbers are defined as extensions, but numbers appear to be
defined as the extensions of different sorts of concepts in the two cases. Ordin-
ary concepts, such as the concept horse, are what Frege calls ‘first-level’: These
are concepts under which objects do or do not fall. But there are also con-
cepts under which first-level concepts do or do not fall. A simple example is
the concept being instantiated. Such a concept is said to be “second-level”. So
the two definitions appear to define numbers as the extensions of concepts of
different levels: In Die Grundlagen, numbers are defined as the extensions of
second-level concepts, whereas, in Grundgesetze, they are defined as the exten-
sions of first-level concepts. The obvious thought is thus that one important
3Whether it is permanently lost is not so clear (Wehmeier and Schmidt am Busch, 2005).
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change might have been the introduction of the extensions of first-level con-
cepts into a system that had previously made use only of the extensions of
second -level concepts.
It is, I think, very widely supposed that Frege’s definition of number does
change in this sort of way, and I too thought it did before giving the matter
serious thought (Boolos and Heck, 2011, 71, esp. fn. 2). But it doesn’t.4 To be
sure, at first glance, the definition of number in Die Grundlagen does appear
to characterize numbers as the extensions of second-level concepts. But this
first impression is misleading, as close examination of a well-known footnote
attached to that definition reveals:
I believe that for “extension of the concept” we could write simply “concept”. But this
would be open to two objections:
1. that this contradicts my earlier statement that the individual numbers are objects…;
2. that concepts can have identical extensions without themselves coinciding.
I am, as it happens, convinced that both these objections can be met; but to do this
would take us too far afield for present purposes. (Frege, 1884, §68, fn. 1)
Frege appears to be suggesting that he might just as well have defined number
this way:
TheNumber that belongs to the conceptF is the concept “equinumerous
with the concept F ”.
And the first objection he considers is that this would define numbers as con-
cepts, whereas Frege has argued, as the title of the first division of Chapter IV
puts it, that “Every individual number is a self-subsistent object”. So when
Frege says that this objection “can be met”, he presumably means that it can
be refuted. And, of course, Frege famously argues eight years later, in ‘On
Concept and Object’, that the phrase ‘the concept “equinumerous with the
concept F ”’ denotes an object, despite appearances to the contrary. So I take
that to be his view here, as well.
It’s less clear what the point of the second objection is, but we can uncover
it easily enough by considering these two phrases:
 the number of moons of Earth
 the number of even primes
What Frege is suggesting in the footnote we are discussing is that these could
be defined as:
 the concept “equinumerous with the concept moon of Earth”
 the concept “equinumerous with the concept even prime”
4It is also somewhat implausible, technically speaking, that Frege should have made use only of
second-level extensions. But he might have made use both of first- and of second-level extensions,
if he had not yet discovered the way extensions can be used to reduce second-level functions to
first-level functions.
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And the objection is that, even if these two phrases pick out co-extensive con-
cepts, they do not pick out the same concept—which, if one individuates con-
cepts intensionally, is exactly right. So when Frege says that he thinks this
objection too “can be met”, he is saying, in the first instance, that, contrary
to what the objector is claiming, concepts can’t “have identical extensions
without themselves coinciding”: They are extensional, not intensional. This
point too is one for which Frege argues explicitly only later. Most comment-
ators have taken it to be implicit in ‘Function and Concept’, but it is made
explicitly in the unpublished fragment ‘Comments on Sense and Meaning’
(Frege, 1892–95, 121–2).5
So, putting all this together, Frege is claiming that the phrase ‘the concept
F ’ denotes an object whose identity-conditions are the same as those of ex-
tensions of concepts. Now, to be sure, it does not follow that the objects in
question are extensions of concepts.Theymight be some other sort of concept-
correlate. But, as well as being ontologically implausible, this would have the
consequence that the suggestion Frege is making in the footnote amounts not
just to a change of wording but also to a change of doctrine: a change in what
objects numbers are being defined to be (Burge, 2005, 283–4). But Frege’s
language strongly suggests that, at least in the context of this particular defin-
ition (or sort of definition),6 he regards the phrases ‘the concept F ’ and ‘the
extension of the concept F ’ as interchangeable: When Frege says that “for
‘extension of the concept’ we could write simply ‘concept’ ” [ für ‘Umfang des
Begriffes’ einfach ‘Begriff’ gesagt werden könnte], that sounds very much as if we
are being told that we could rephrase the definition if we wished.
But, if that is right, then we can exchange the two phrases either way. So
it looks as if Frege would have regarded all of these (and more besides) as
equivalent:
The extension of the concept “concept that is equinumerous with the
extension of the concept F ”.
The concept “concept that is equinumerous with the concept F ”.
The extension of the concept “extension that is equinumerous with the
extension of the concept F ”.
5One might suggest, instead, that Frege’s answer to the second objection depends upon his
answer to the first: It’s not that concepts are extensional, but that ‘the concept’ is extensional. But,
if that were Frege’s view, I don’t think he would have expressed himself the way he does in the
footnote we are discussing.
6This view therefore does not imply, as Schirn (1990, 28) claims, that ‘the extension of the
concept F ’ can be rephrased as ‘the extension of the extension of the concept F ’. I’m not sug-
gesting general interchangeability. In particular, such interchange will not be possible when the
phrase ‘the concept F ’ is being used in such a way that it really does need to refer to a concept
(even if it can’t). And, in the phrase ‘the extension of the concept F ’, that is what it needs to do:
It is not some objectual correlate of a concept, whatever that is, that actually has an extension, but
the concept itself. In any event, Frege’s view is that use of the phrase ‘the concept F ’ is, from the
standpoint of logic, extremely problematic. It is a mistake to try to ascribe some coherent view
to Frege about how such phrases work. On his view, such phrases do not work.
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And now the only difference between the definition given in Die Grundlagen
and the one given in Grundgesetze is verbal.7
18.2 VALUE-RANGES VERSUS EXTENSIONS
There is another difference between the definitions of number in Die Grund-
lagen and in Grundgesetze. In both books, numbers are defined as extensions,
but, in the later book, extensions are regarded as a species of value-range. And
so, the thought might be, the crucial innovation that forced Frege to abandon
his early manuscript might have been the introduction of value-ranges.
When I stopped unthinkingly assuming the view I just dismissed, I un-
thinkingly adopted this one. But it too faces a serious objection: The intro-
duction of value-ranges into a system that already allows for reference to ex-
tensions is not the sort of change that would have required Frege to discard
his early manuscript. This point will be obvious, once stated, to anyone who
is familiar with the mechanics of the formal system of Grundgesetze, but it is
worth developing nonetheless.
The extension of a concept is intuitively the class of objects of which it
is true. The notion of a value-range is simply a generalization of the notion
of extension. In Function and Concept, Frege compares the value-range of a
function to its graph (Frege, 1891, 8–10). Two functions have the same value-
range just in case they have the same graph, that is, just in case they always
have the same value for the same argument. One may thus think of a monadic
function’s value-range as the class of ordered pairs of its arguments and values,
though, for Frege, the notion of an ordered pair is to be defined in terms of
that of a value-range (Grundgesetze I, §144), not vice versa (just as the notion
of a class is to be defined in terms of that of an extension, not vice versa).
But the notion of value-range not only generalizes the notion of extension,
it subsumes it. As is familiar, on Frege’s mature view, a monadic, first-level
concept is taken to be a function from objects to truth-values. Like any func-
tion, it thus has a value-range. And like any two functions, two concepts will
have the same value-range if, and only if, they always have the same value
for the same argument. Since this value is always a truth-value, that condi-
tion simply reduces to the condition that the same objects must fall under
the two concepts. Thus, the extension of a concept may be identified with its
value-range (Frege, 1891, 16).
In Grundgesetze, Frege makes use of value-ranges for a wide variety of pur-
poses. The most important of these is that they secure the ontology needed
for arithmetic via the explicit definition of number. But, of course, extensions
might have done that job equally well: Value-ranges, as opposed to extensions,
are not needed for the definition of number; the definition in Die Grundla-
gen, as noted, is purely in terms of extensions, and it can easily be made to
7Kevin Klement (2012, §3) argues for essentially the same conclusion, on much the same
grounds. Our work was independent.
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work. Modulo, as one always says at this sort of point, the inconsistency of
the theory of extensions that Frege is assuming. It is worth emphasizing, how-
ever, that Basic Law V is inconsistent only if we assume11 comprehension (or
full second-order comprehension, as Frege did). And it has been known for
some time now that the analogue of Basic Law V for extensions—see below—
is consistent if we assume just predicative comprehension. Moreover, we can
prove the axioms of Robinson arithmetic in the resulting theory, making use
of Frege’s definition of numbers in terms of extensions and, indeed, of many
of his proofs (Heck, 1996). The identificaton of extensions as a type of value-
range therefore would have had no effect upon Frege’s proofs of the axioms of
arithmetic.
So the question must be asked what other advantages the introduction of
value-ranges might have had. There are some, to be sure, but they are mostly
of a technical nature.
The most important of these is the way value-ranges allow us to define the
extensions of relations. Frege explains this construction in some detail:
[L]et us start with the function with two arguments + . If we take, e.g., the number
3 as -argument, then we have in  + 3 a function with just one argument, whose
value-range is "("+3). The same holds for every -argument, and we have in "("+ )
a function with one argument, whose value is always a value-range. If we take the -
and the -argument together with the value of the function  +  to be represented
as rectangular co-ordinates in space, then we can display the value-range "(" + 3) as
a straight line. If we allow the -argument to vary continuously, then the straight line
moves accordingly and thereby describes a plane. In each of its positions it displays a
value-range, the value of the function "("+) for a given -argument.The value-range
of the function "("+ ) is now "("+ ), and this is what I call a double value-range.
… If a function with two arguments is a relation, then we may say ‘extension of the
relation’ as an alternative to ‘double value-range’. (Grundgesetze I, §36)
Frege thus does not need any special notion of the extension of a relation: He
can instead make use of double value-ranges. And it is easy enough to prove
that double value-ranges satisfy the obvious analogue of Basic Law V:
"(f") = "(g")  8x8y(fxy = gxy)
Frege does not bother to prove this result, however, since Theorems 2 and 3
of Grundgesetze do the necessary work.8
This lovely little construction works, however, only under the assump-
tion that truth-values are objects. Consider what would happen if we tried
to mimic it in an ordinary sort of theory augmented by a form of Basic Law
V governing just extensions:
8In modern notation, these are:
f(a; b) = aS(bS"f("; ))) (2)
"f("; )) = q ! f(a; b) = aS(bSq) (3)
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(x^Fx = x^Gx)  8x(Fx  Gx)
Consider, in particular, the relation  < . Following Frege, we can take the
-argument to be 3 and then consider the extension of result: x^(3 < x). And if
we then let 3 vary again, we do indeed have a function x^( < x) from objects
to extensions. But that is as far as we can go, since the “double extension” term
‘y^x^(x < y)’ is not even well-formed. Extension terms are formed by prefixing
‘y^’, say, to a one-place predicate, the argument-place of which is then filled by
‘y’. But ‘x^(x < )’ is not a predicate. It’s a functional expression.
It is important to be clear that the issue here concerns whether truth-values
are objects, that is, members of a single domain that also includes such things
as people and numbers. The issue is not whether there are such things as truth-
values, or whether concepts are functions from objects to truth-values.9 It is
perfectly possible to regard concepts as functions from objects to truth-values,
but to regard the two truth-values as sui generis, as, in effect, occupying their
own separate domain.
Suppose, then, that we do regard truth-values as sui generis. How might
we handle the extensions of relations? One possibility, of course, would be to
introduce a new primitive notion, governed by an analogue of Basic Law V
cxyRxy = cxyQxy  8x8y(Rxy  Qxy)
that allows us to speak of the extensions of relations. But this has two obvious
disadvantages: It requires introducing another axiom with all the same prob-
lems that Basic Law V has, and it just feels redundant. Another option would
be to admit both value-ranges and extensions to the system. We could then
take the extension of the relation  < , e.g., to be the value-range of the func-
tion x^(x < ). More generally, cxyRxy could be defined as: x^(Rx). But
this has the same disadvantages.
A quite different option would be to use ordered pairs: The extension of a
binary relationR can be taken to be a set of ordered pairs. More specifically,
it will be the extension of the unary concept that is true of a given pair just in
case the relation is true of its members, in the relevant order (which is why we
need ordered pairs). To implement this idea, we need first to define, for each
relation, the corresponding concept that is true of ordered pairs:
xy(Rxy; a)
df 9x9y(a = <x; y> ^Rxy)
The extension of a relation can then be defined as:
cxyRxy df= z^xy(Rxy; z)
Given the usual axiom governing ordered pairs
9The need to be careful about this difference is, of course, emphasized by Dummett (1981,
183ff).
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<a; b> = <c; d>  a = c ^ b = d (OP)
we can then easily derive the analogue of Basic Law V for relations that was
mentioned above.
This treatment would of course require us either to take (OP) as an axiom
or else to define pairs in such a way as to prove it. But one might suspect
that ordered pairs are going to be needed somewhere along the way, anyway.
And one might suspect, too, that pairs would eventually prove to be definable,
though the specific definition Frege gives in Grundgesetze would not work
here, since it uses double value-ranges.10 The familiar Kuratowski definition
of pairs
<a; b> = ffag; fa; bgg
would work, of course, though Kuratowski did not propose it until 1922,
and it is somewhat peculiar. But there is an obvious other sort of definition,
due to Hausdorff: <a; b> = ffa; 0g; fb; 1gg, where 0 and 1 are any distinct
objects. Frege could have used x^(x 6= x) and x^(x = x). But the adequacy
of Hausdorff’s definition is not completely obvious, and Frege’s definition in
Grundgesetze is peculiar enough itself that it might make one wonder whether
he could have had another, simpler definition to hand. If not, then perhaps
Frege originally treated pairs as primitive, and as subject to (OP).
What is really interesting, however, is that pairs appear to have played a
significant role in the version of Grundgesetze on which Frege was working
in the late 1880s. Although most of Frege’s Nachlass is, as I said earlier, now
lost, a record of its contents has been preserved in the so-called Scholz lists.
In November 1889, Frege wrote a series of notes that Scholz labels ‘Short
presentation of the concept-script from his current standpoint’ (Veraart, 1976,
100–1). Scholz summarizes a portion of those notes as follows:
Value-range,Kennzeichnung. Function. Concept. Relation. Expression. Equality. Defin-
ition. The pair. Number. Equinumerosity.
Now, as I have said, ordered pairs do appear in Grundgesetze. They are intro-
duced in §144 of the first volume, as a tool Frege uses in the formalization
of inductive definitions. But they do not play any fundamental role. I have
argued elsewhere, in fact, that Frege knew that it would have been possible for
him to avoid using pairs in his proofs (Heck, 2012, §7.2). But in the notes
from 1889, Frege seems to regard the pair as a notion of fundamental import-
ance, and it is notable that it seems to be introduced just as Frege is preparing
to introduce the notions of number and equinumerosity. This is exactly where
quantification over relations becomes important in Frege’s construction.
Goran Sundholm, who first made this observation, suggests that it shows
that “Frege did not have the doctrine of (objectual) truth-values” in 1889
(Sundholm, 2001, 62). Sundholm’s thought is that the reason pairs play a less
10The definition is: <a; b> = "(aSbS"). So the pair of a and b is the extension of the concept
aSbS, i.e., the class containing the double-value ranges of all relations in which a stands to b.
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prominent role in Grundgesetze than they once had is that Frege changed how
he was defining the extensions of relations: The original definition used pairs,
whereas the later one of course uses double value-ranges. But, as we saw above,
what is needed in order to give the later definition is precisely the doctrine of
objectual truth-values. So it must be that Frege only adopted that doctrine
some time after 1889. But this argument is clearly inconclusive. Frege might
already have been committed to the doctrine of objectual truth-values in 1889
but simply not yet have discovered the double value-range construction. It is
not as if that construction is completely obvious, either. To the contrary, it is
quite subtle.
There are other problems with Sundholm’s interpretation, as well.The first
point worth noting is that there is excellent reason to think that, already by
1884, Frege regarded concepts as functions from objects to truth-values.11
Familiarly, in his mature period, Frege regarded concepts as extensional. This
is not a natural view, and many of Frege’s readers have been puzzled by it. But
it was not always Frege’s view: In 1881, he regarded concepts as intensional.
This emerges from the following argument:
[W]e must distinguish between concept and thing, even when only one thing falls
under a concept. The concept “planet whose distance from the sun is between that
of Venus and that of Mars” is still something different from the individual object the
Earth, even though it alone falls under the concept. Otherwise you couldn’t form con-
cepts with different contents whose extensions were all limited to this one thing, the
Earth. (Frege, 1880–81, 18)
Frege takes it to be perfectly obvious that one can form such concepts, e.g.,
the concepts planet whose distance from the sun is between that of Venus and that
of Mars and planet in the solar system with intelligent life. This is so obvious to
Frege, in fact, that he does not bother to argue for the claim, even though it is
playing a central role in an argument for a conclusion that matters very much
to him: that “we must distinguish between concept and thing”.
As we saw earlier, however, Frege changes his view about concepts by the
time he publishes Die Grundlagen. In the footnote to §68 quoted above (see
page 500), Frege implicitly commits himself to the view that there can’t be
distinct concepts that have identical extensions, i.e., to the view that concepts
are extensional. I find it very hard to imagine how Frege might have intended
to defend this view other than as he eventually does in Function and Concept:
by identifying concepts with functions from objects to truth-values.12 I find
it even more puzzling why Frege would have abandoned the natural view that
concepts are intensional in favor of the utterly unnatural view that they are
extensional unless he had very good reason to do so. Unless, indeed, he was
all but forced to do so.
11Robert May and I have discussed this issue in more detail elsewhere (Heck and May, 2018,
§2).
12Of course, this depends upon the view, which Frege also held, that functions are extensional.
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This point, however, is obviously consistent with Sundholm’s claim that
Frege did not regard truth-values as objects in 1889: He might have regarded
truth-values as sui generis. But if he did regard them as sui generis, then, as we
saw above, extensions would not be a type of value-range but would also be
sui generis. And that would make it at least somewhat surprising that Frege
should even mention value-ranges in 1889, since value-ranges that are not
extensions play absolutely no role in Grundgesetze: I know of no argument
in Grundgesetze that would be adversely affected if quantifers that purport to
range over value-ranges generally were instead restricted to range over just ex-
tensions.13 Of course, Frege’s objectual quantifiers do in fact range over value-
ranges generally (indeed, over objects generally) and not just over extensions
of concepts. But the interesting case, the relevant case, always involves exten-
sions. For example, predecession is characterized as the extension of a relation
and equinumerosity requires there to be a relation whose extension has cer-
tain properties. So if extensions were not being treated as value-ranges, there
would be no need for Frege even to mention value-ranges. They play no other
role in his work.
Even stranger is the mention of Kennzeichnungen. This is clearly Scholz’s
terminology—there is no such technical term in Frege’s extant writings—and
I have left it untranslated because it is not immediately obvious what Scholz
meant by it.14 The natural English translation is ‘identifications’, but the term
is often used byGerman authors in connection with Russell’s theory of descrip-
tions. Indeed, the common German term nowadays for ‘theory of descrip-
tions’ is: Kennzeichnungstheorie. Scholz thus seems to be referring to Frege’s
“substitute for the definite article of ordinary language”, which he introduces
in §11 of Grundgesetze and which he treats as a one-place, first-level function
symbol: K.15 It means, very roughly: the unique member of . More precisely,
if b is the value-range (extension) of a concept that is true of exactly one object,
then Kb is that object; otherwise, it is b itself. Thus, the Basic Law that governs
‘K’ is Law VI:
K"(" = a) = a
And the important point about ‘K’, for our purposes, is that it is used ex-
actly one time in all of Grundgesetze: in Frege’s definition of the “application
operator” S,16 which is to value-ranges as membership is to extensions.
13Indeed, in some of the arguments concerning the reals, Frege has explicitly to restrict certain
quantifers so that they range only over the extensions of relations. That is the significance, for
example, of the subcomponent "S(Sp) = p that one finds in the definition of a positival class
(Grundgesetze II, §175).
14Theword ‘Kennzeichen’ and its cognates occur a handful of times inGrundgesetze, but always
in an informal, ordinary sense. (Thanks to Marcus Rossberg and Philip Ebert for pointing me to
these uses.)
15This is also how Sundholm understands Scholz.
16This is Dummett’s terminology. It’s natural to read ‘aSb’ as: the result of applying b to a, or:
b applied to a.
i
i
“Essays_on_Frege_Basic_Laws_OUP_final” — 2019/7/29 — 11:29 — page 508 — #520 i
i
i
i
i
i
508 Richard Kimberly Heck
If we have extensions, then we can define membership very simply:
a 2 b df 9F (b = x^Fx ^ Fa)
That is: a is in b if there is a concept whose extension is b and under which
a falls. But if we treat truth-values as objects, and extensions as value-ranges,
then things are not quite so simple. It is thus that Frege gives the following
definition:
aSb
df K"[9f(b = "f" ^ " = fa)]
This definition makes aSb the sole member of the value-range of the concept
object that is the result of applying the function whose value-range is b to a. And
if, indeed, b is the value-range of some function, then it is the value-range
of a unique function, and the result of applying that function to a will be
completely determined, so that " will be unique, and aSb will have a sensible
value. And if, in fact, b is the value-range (extension) of a concept, then aSb
will be the True or the False as a does or does not fall under that concept. So
aSb acts very much like a 2 b, but is defined for the general case of value-
ranges of functions, not just of concepts.
So, again, I emphasize: Frege uses ‘K’ only in this definition. He uses it
for no other purpose in Grundgesetze. So it would be utterly inexplicable why
it appears in Scholz’s table of contents, unless Frege were treating extensions
as value-ranges.17
And yet, it still does not follow that Frege must have been treating truth-
values as objects already in 1889. It is no doubt tempting to draw that in-
ference. How else could extensions be identified with value-ranges? In fact,
however, the answer is quite obvious: One might simply regard the extension
of a concept as the value-range of its characteristic function, and I have sug-
gested elsewhere that Frege’s treatment of truth-values as objects amounts, in
large part, to an identification of concepts with their characteristic functions
(Heck, 2011c, 134ff).
To make this work, we obviously need to be able to define, quite generally,
the characteristic function associated with a given concept. It is easy enough
to define, so to speak, a concept’s characteristic relation:
z(Fz)(a; b)
df [(Fa ^ b = >) _ (:Fa ^ b = ?)]
Here,> and? are distinct objects, chosen arbitrarily and as convenient. (Frege
might have chosen "(" = ") for > and "(" 6= ") for ?, for example.) To
convert this relation to a function, we can make use of something akin to
Frege’s “substitute for the definite article”. What we need is a second-level
17Again, in principle, there is the possibility that Frege was not treating extensions as value-
ranges but was also using value-ranges for some other purpose. But value-ranges that are not
extensions play no role in Grundgesetze, so there is no such “other role” for value-ranges to play.
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function from a concept to the unique object that falls under it. Let us write
it: x(Fx), and take it to be governed by an analogue of Law VI:
[x(Fx) = a]  8y(Fy  a = y)
Then the characteristic function associated with a concept F can be defined
as:
z(Fz)(a)
df
= x[z(Fz)(a; x)]
This will have the value > if Fa and the value ? if :Fa. And we can then
identify the extension of F with the value-range of that function:
x^Fx
df
= "[z(Fz)(")]
To define membership, we can either proceed in Frege’s way, using K, or, if
we really only care about membership in extensions, we can use the usual
definition of membership explained above.
So, in principle, Frege could have treated extensions as value-ranges without
treating truth-values as objects. But, honestly, it doesn’t really seem very plaus-
ible that the quirky construction just elaborated is actually Frege’s own. Rather,
it seems more likely that, as I suggested above, Frege was already treating truth-
values as objects in 1889 and that he was using pairs to define the extensions of
relations because he had not yet discovered the double value-range construc-
tion.18
It is hard to know for sure, but this last hypothesis is arguably confirmed
by remarks Frege makes in the very last paragraph of Function and Concept.19
Frege writes:
Again, instead of functions of two arguments we can deal with functions of a single but
complex argument; but the distinction between functions of one and of two arguments
still holds in all its sharpness. (Frege, 1891, 31)
Frege is referring to the previous paragraph, in which he has claimed that
second-level functions can be reduced, via value-ranges, to first-level functions.
That reduction of course figures heavily in Grundgesetze. But the mentioned
reduction of two-argument functions to one-argument functions does not ap-
pear in Grundgesetze at all. What we find instead is precisely the double value-
range construction, which reduces the value-ranges of two-place functions to
the value-ranges of one-place functions. And yet, “objectual truth-values” are
uncontroversially present in Function and Concept. It thus seems that Frege
continued to use ordered pairs to reduce binary functions to unary functions
even after the introduction of objectual truth-values. So one cannot use the
18Sundholm is impressed by the fact that truth-values are not mentioned in the parts of the
notebook we are discussing, but are discussed shortly thereafter. But there could be many reasons
for this, and I am not sure how much weight we can put on what Scholz chose to mention and
what he chose not to mention.
19There is some other textual evidence that might bear upon this issue, too, but it is not terribly
reliable. Still, see note 55.
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mention of pairs in the 1889 manuscript to argue that Frege was not yet treat-
ing truth-values as objects at that time.
In any event, Frege did eventually discover the double value-range con-
struction, and at that point he no longer needed to use ordered pairs to define
the extensions of concepts.This simplified his theory and eliminated any need
there might have been to assume some Basic Law governing ordered pairs. But
this happened very late, and it is not even on Frege’s list of changes in Grund-
gesetze, presumably because he had never committed himself in print.
But this may explain why Frege uses pairs the way he does in his treatment
of inductive defintions: That may be a kind of holdover from a time when
pairs played a more fundamental role. But the elimination of pairs in favor
of double value-ranges does not seem like the sort of change that would have
required Frege “to jettison a nearly completed handwritten work.”20 If we are
to discover where the really significant differences between Begriffsschrift and
Grundgesetze lie, then, we must look elsewhere.
18.3 FREGE’S CHANGING VIEWS ABOUT FUNCTIONS
Frege says in the Foreword to Grundgesetze (ix) that the long delay in its pub-
lication was due “in part to internal changes within the concept-script”. The
deepest of these, I want to suggest, concerns how Frege understands the nature
of functions.21
That there is a fundamental difference between concepts and functions, on
the one hand, and objects, on the other, is among the most famous of Frege’s
mature views. Frege regards it as central to logic, so much so that the first topic
he discusses in Part I of Grundgesetze is the unsaturatedness of functions.
A distinction between function and argument is central to the logical
theory of Begriffsschrift, too. It is in terms of it that Frege introduces his new
notation for generality:
In the expression of a judgement we can always regard the combination of signs to
the right of as a function of one of the signs occurring in it. If we replace this
argument by a German letter and if in the content stroke we introduce a concavity
with this German letter in it, as in
a (a);
this stands for the judgement that, whatever wemay take for its argument, the function
is a fact. (Frege, 1879a, §11, emphasis removed)
20The thought here is that Frege could simply have replaced primitive pairs with defined ones,
and no wholesale changes to his proofs would then be required. This may well be exactly what he
did in the parts of Grundgesetze in which pairs do still occur.
21The issues discussed in this section are given a more complete treatment in ‘The Function is
Unsaturated’ (Heck and May, 2013).
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The notion of function that Frege is using here is, familiarly, a generalization
of the usual mathematical notion, and Frege spends §§9–10 of Begriffsschrift
explaining it.
We thus find Frege making what looks like the same sort of distinction in
Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze. But how Frege understands that distinction
changes profoundly. Frege not only mentions this fact in the Foreword to
Grundgesetze, as said earlier, but explicitly mentions one of the consequences
of the change:
[T]he nature of functions, in contrast to objects, is characterized more precisely than
in my Begriffsschrift. Further, from this the distinction between functions of first and
second level results. (Grundgesetze I, x)
Frege is not quite saying, but is obviously implying, that there was no distinc-
tion between first- and second-level functions in Begriffsschrift, and we shall
see shortly that, indeed, there was not. Perhaps more interesting is Frege’s re-
mark concerning why no such distinction was drawn there: The distinction
between function and object was not characterized sufficiently “precisely” in
Begriffsschrift. We will need to make a distinction between levels of functions
only if we insist that functions differ so fundamentally from objects that it
is impossible for a (unary) function to take both functions and objects as ar-
guments. Frege’s point is thus not simply that the distinction between func-
tion and object is drawn more carefully in Grundgesetze than in Begriffsschrift,
though it certainly is. His point is that the distinction between function and
object is enforced in his later work in a way that it was not enforced in his
earlier work.
InGrundgesetze, Frege clearly distinguishes between first- and second-order
quantification. Thus, there are two forms of the axiom of universal instanti-
ation. Basic Law IIa:
Fa
a Fa
expresses the first-order form, and Basic Law IIb:
Fa
F Fa
expresses the second-order form. Frege also introduces first- and second-order
quantification in different sections of the book. First-order quantification ap-
pears already in §8, whereas Frege does not even begin his discussion of second-
order quantification until §20, and the official assignment of a reference to the
second-order quantifier occurs only in §24. The reason is that an adequate
statement of what the reference of the second-order quantifier is to be de-
pends upon the distinction between first- and second-level functions. That is
the topic of §§21–3.
In Begriffsschrift, by contrast, Frege’s initial explanation of the quantifier,
partially quoted above, continues as follows:
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Since a letter used as a sign for a function, such as  in (A), can itself be regarded as
the argument of a function, its place can be taken, in the manner just specified, by a
German letter. (Frege, 1879a, §11)
There is simply no indication here that Frege regards “function quantifica-
tion” as differing in any important way from “argument quantification”. And
in the formal theory of Begriffsschrift, there is just one axiom of universal in-
stantiation, proposition (58):
f(c)
a f(a)
That is not to say that Begriffsschrift does not contain plenty of what we would
regard as “second-order” quantification. Of course it does. So how does Frege
reason with “second-order” quantifiers if he has only (58) to use? The answer
is that Frege regards the “second-order” form of (58), displayed here:
f(c)
F F(a)
as a substitution instance of the first-order form. We get it by replacing ‘a’ with
‘F’, ‘f( )’ with ‘ (c)’, and ‘c’ with ‘f ’ in proposition (58). And it is perfectly
acceptable, by Frege’s lights, to substitute names for function-symbols and vice
versa, in the way I just did. See, for example, his instantiation of (60) just after
(92).
Frege famously writes in Function and Concept that the distinction between
function and object “is not made arbitrarily, but founded deep in the nature
of things” (Frege, 1891, 31). But in Begriffsschrift, he regards the distinction
between function and argument as one we impose in thought: It “has nothing
to do with the conceptual content [but] comes about only because we view
the expression [of a conceptual content] in a particular way” (Frege, 1879a,
§9). What we regard as a function we may, if it is convenient, also regard as
an argument (Frege, 1879a, §10). The possibility of shifting perspectives in
this way is what, in Begriffsschrift, makes quantification over both objects and
functions possible.
It is important to appreciate how deep this difference between the earlier
and later views goes. On Frege’s mature view, the sentence ‘Bob meows’ is
composed of a name, ‘Bob’, and a concept-expression, ‘ meows’, where the
placeholder ‘’ indicates the kind of unsaturatedness that this predicate has.
But one can also regard the sentence as saying something like: Meowing is
something Bob does. To parse the sentence that way is to regard its subject as
being ‘ meows’ and its predicate as being a “second-level” concept-expression
that we might write ‘Bobx(x)’. Here, the capital ‘’ and bound variable ‘x’
together indicate the sort of incompeteness this expression has: Its argument-
place must be filled by a first-level concept-expression, one that itself has the
right sort of argument-place to be filled by the bound variable ‘x’.
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There are undeniably echoes of such ideas in Begriffsschrift, but the earlier
conception is entirely different. Starting again with the sentence ‘Bob meows’,
the Frege of Begriffsschrift would have us imagine one of the two words that
comprise the sentence as varying. If we think of ‘Bob’ as varying—as poten-
tially replaced by other expressions—then we are taking ‘Bob’ to be the ar-
gument and ‘meows’ to be the function. If, on the other hand, we think of
‘meows’ as varying, then we are taking ‘meows’ to be the argument and ‘Bob’
to be the function. Frege simply does not say anything in Begriffsschrift that
indicates that he regarded these situations as anything other than symmetrical.
If he had, that would have forced him to distinguish levels of functions in a
way he simply doesn’t at that time.
Part of the reason Frege thinks this way in Begriffsschrift is that his con-
ception of functions in that book is almost completely formalistic.22 This is
clear from Frege’s general statement of the distinction between function and
argument:
If in an expression … a simple or a compound sign has one or more occurrences and
if we regard that sign as replaceable in all or some of these occurrences by something
else …, then we call that part that remains invariant in the expression a function, and
the replaceable part the argument of the function. (Frege, 1879a, §9, my emphasis)
Read without prejudice, this passage seems to state quite directly that func-
tions are expressions. Whether this was really Frege’s considered view is perhaps
not so clear. Frankly, it often seems to me as if Frege hadn’t really thought
through many of the philosophical claims he makes in Begriffsschrift, which
wouldn’t really be that surprising if it were true, since Frege had not, at that
time, devoted much time to philosophy. Maybe we should just say that Frege’s
sloppiness about use and mention leads him sometimes to confuse functions
with expressions in Begriffsschrift, or at least not to distinguish between func-
tions and expressions as clearly as he should. But to some extent, at least, Frege
treats the distinction between function and argument as a purely linguistic
distinction, not as a metaphysical one. That is why I said that ‘Bob’ is the
argument, and ‘meows’ is the function, not that ‘Bob’ denotes the argument
and ‘meows’ denotes the function. That sort of semantical language is simply
absent from Begriffsschrift.
In fact, Frege never does say exactly what “remains invariant” when ‘Bob’ is
imagined to vary in ‘Bobmeows’. In his mature work, he would of course have
said that it was the unsaturated predicate ‘ meows’. In Begriffsschrift, by con-
22In his exposition of Frege’s work, Philip Jourdain mentions, in his list of “advances made by
Frege from 1879 to 1893”, that “the traces of formalism in the Begriffsschrift vanished: a function
ceased to be called a name or expression” (Jourdain, 1980, 204). Frege himself commented extens-
ively on Jourdain’s piece: Many of his comments were included by Jourdain as (sometimes very
long) footnotes. Given Frege’s aversion to formalism, it seems unlikely that, if he had regarded
this remark as incorrect, he would not have said so.
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trast, he tends to use infinitives.23 Thus, he might have said that what remains
fixed when ‘Bob’ varies is ‘to meow’, and there is no indication in Begriffs-
schrift that Frege would have regarded ‘to meow’ as in any way “incomplete”.
Prima facie, in fact, infinitives are complete in a way the finite form, at least,
is not: They can occur as subjects, for example, in such sentences as ‘To meow
is nicer than to growl’.24
What we really want to know, however, is what “remains invariant” when
we vary ‘meows’. And if one considers the question naïvely, then the obvious
thing to say is that what remains invariant is just ‘Bob’. Frege’s mature view,
as I have said, was different: What remains invariant, he would have said in
Grundgesetze, is not ‘Bob’ but the incomplete expression:(Bob). But nothing
Frege says in Begriffsschrift remotely suggests such a sophisticated view. And
if he had held such a view, he could not simply have gestured at it but would
have needed to explain it in detail, as he does in his later work.
Frege’s view in Begriffsschrift thus seems to have been that a sentence like
‘Bob meows’ is composed of two parts: ‘Bob’ and ‘to meow’. Both of these
can be regarded either as argument or as function: If ‘Bob’ is the argument,
then ‘to meow’ is the function, and if ‘to meow’ is the argument, then ‘Bob’
is the function. And so, indeed, we can see why Frege insisted that the distinc-
tion between function and argument “has nothing to do with the conceptual
content [but] comes about only because we view the expression in a particular
way” (Frege, 1879a, §9).
There is a feature of the formal theory of Begriffsschrift that one might
think undermines the foregoing. It has to do with how Frege indicates the
substitutions that are being made when he cites propositions already proven.
If something is to be substituted for a function-symbol, then Frege indicates
what the argument of the function-symbol is, thus: f( ). (I was following
Frege when I said, on page 512, that ‘f( )’ was to be replaced with ‘ (c)’.)
It might look, therefore, as if Frege was using ‘ ’ in much the same way he
uses ‘’ and ‘’ in his mature work: to indicate incompleteness. But the reason
Frege uses ‘ ’ as he does is purely formal.25 If we are going to replace a free
function-variable with a more complex expression, then we need to indicate
what the argument-places of that expression are. Suppose, for example, that we
start with (58) again. We cannot just say that ‘f ’ is to be replaced by ‘g ! hb’,
for example,26 since this would be compatible with many different results:
23TheEnglish translation sometimes uses gerunds rather than infinitives, but Frege consistently
uses infinitives in §9, when he is introducing his conception of function. For example, he describes
the two functions we can uncover in ‘Wasserstoffgas leichter als Kohnlensäuegas ist’ as ‘leichter
als Kohnlensäuegas zu sein’ and ‘schwerer als Wasserstoffgas zu sein’.
24Whether such expressions really are, in some sense, incomplete is of course an empirical
question for linguistic theory.
25And when Frege does start to talk about incompleteness, he does not adopt capital Greek
letters for this use, but instead uses empty parentheses. See note 34.
26I’ll use contemporary notation here, since otherwise things will get unwieldy fast.
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8x(gx! hb)! (ga! hb)
8x(gx! hxb)! (ga! hab)
8x(gx! hbx)! (ga! hba)
depending upon what argument-places ‘g ! hb’ is supposed to have. Hence,
Frege would say that we are replacing ‘f( )’ with ‘g  ! hb ’, and now it
is clear what is intended. That is why Frege does not bother to indicate the
argument-places of function-symbols when he substitutes function-symbols
for terms, as in proposition (77), where ‘F ’ is substituted for ‘c’. (I was again
following Frege when I said that ‘c’ was to be replaced with ‘f ’.)There is simply
no need to indicate the argument-places in this case.
18.4 THE WAGES OF UNSATURATEDNESS
As we saw above, once an absolute distinction between concept and object is in
place, a distinction between different levels of functions is also required. The
abandonment of the linguistic conception of functions Frege held in Begriffs-
schrift in favor of the conception of functions as unsaturated would therefore
have required Frege to make several changes to his formal system. He would,
for example, have been forced to distinguish first- from second-order quantific-
ation and so to change how he justified certain of the inferences he wasmaking.
A new axiom of second-order universal instantiation would have been needed
to justify inferences previously justified by cross-type substitution into what
would now be regarded as the ambiguous proposition (58). That alone would
have required Frege to make extensive changes to his original manuscript.
An even more significant change concerns the notation Frege uses in Be-
griffsschrift for defined notions. It is easy enough to reinterpret some of it so
that it conforms to his mature understanding of the nature of functions. Con-
sider, for example, Frege’s definition of functionality, that is, of a relation’s
being many–one. That definition, written in modern notation, reads as fol-
lows:27
If(; )
df 8e8d(f(d; e)! 8a(f(d; a)! a = e))
Explaining one feature of this notation, Frege writes:28
Lower-case Greek letters … do not represent an independent content, as do German
and Latin ones [that is, bound and free variables].29 The only thing we have to observe
is whether they are identical or different; hence we can put arbitrary lower-case Greek
letters for  and , provided only that the places previously occupied by identical let-
ters are again occupied by identical ones and that different letters are not replaced
27Frege also puts the defined notion on the right, but that is not today’s style.
28These remarks in fact concern the definition of heredity, which is where lowercase Greek
letters are first used. But I really do not want to try to replicate Frege’s notation for heredity here.
29Note that this too contrasts with the sort of thing Frege would later say: that variables only
indicate, whereas names denote.
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by identical ones. Whether Greek letters are identical or different, however, is of sig-
nificance only within the formula for which they were especially introduced … Their
purpose is to enable us to reconstruct unambiguously at any time from the abbreviated
form If(; ) the full one … (Frege, 1879a, §24)
Without the Greek letters, that is to say, we would not know whether ‘I(f)’
was to be read as ‘If(; )’ or as ‘If(; )’—that is, whether it said that
f was many–one or one–many—and matters get worse as the relation in
question gets more complex. But the Greek letters serve only to disambigu-
ate, whereas, in Frege’s mature logic, they would have had an additional pur-
pose. Understood as it would have been in Grundgesetze, the expression ‘I’ so
defined is a second-level predicate, one whose argument-place must be filled
by a name of a two-place, first-level function (Frege, 1891, 29–30).The Greek
letters would then be regarded as bound variables whose role was comparable
to that of the bound variables that occur with quantifiers. Still, there is no
need to change this particular bit of notation, but only how it is understood.
The notation Frege uses for the ancestral poses an entirely different prob-
lem, however. For the “strong” ancestral,30 Frege uses the notation:


f(x ; y)
reading it: y follows x in the f -sequence. Here again, the role of the Greek let-
ters is to allow us to disambiguate what would otherwise be an ambiguous for-
mula (Frege, 1879a, §26). But this notation cannot be reinterpreted the way
the notation for functionality can be. Indeed, from our present perspective, it
is very hard to make any sense of this notation at all. I mean: One can learn
to read it, but one cannot really understand it, except as a mere abbreviation.
There is no intelligible meaning to be assigned to ‘x ’.31 On Frege’s mature
view, by contrast, the strong ancestral would be regarded as a three-place rela-
tion of mixed type: It takes as arguments a two-place, first-level relation and
two objects. An adequate notation might thus be: F"(f"; x; y), where the
Greek letters fill the argument-places of the binary relation-symbol ‘f’ and
are bound by ‘F ’. The Greek letters in ‘ 

f(x ; y)’, on the other hand, do not
function as variables at all, let alone as bound variables, for the simple reason
that they do not occur in the argument-places of anything. They just sort of
dangle off the argument-places.32
30The definition, in modern notation, is:
8F [8z(fxz ! Fz) ^ 8z8w(Fz ^ fzw ! Fw)! Fy]
This is known as the “strong” ancestral because we need not have


f(x ; x).
31Or, for that matter, to: 0 (see Frege, 1880–81, 22ff). I.e., it isn’t the variable that is the
problem.
32This sort of example suggests to me that the common claim that definitions may be regarded
simply as abbreviations is not nearly as obvious as might be supposed. Regarded in that light,
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Formulae of the form ‘ 

f(x ; y)’ would have occurred throughout the
early manuscript. All of them would have had to be replaced. This, then, does
seem like the sort of “internal change[] within the concept-script which [could
have] forced [Frege] to jettison a nearly completed handwritten work” (Grund-
gesetze I, ix).
As is well known, however, Frege does not actually treat functionality and
the ancestral as higher-level functions in Grundgesetze. Frege does still use the
symbol ‘I’ to represent functionality in his mature work, but he regards it
as denoting a first-level concept that applies (truly) only to the double value-
ranges of many–one relations. Similarly, the ancestral is treated as a one-place
first-level function whose intended argument is the double value-range of a
relation and whose value is the double value-range of the ancestral of that
relation. Still, I suspect that this change—treating what are fundamentally
higher-order functions as first-order functions—occurred later than the one
we are presently discussing, because Frege’s commitment to unsaturatedness
appears in his work at least a couple years earlier than his commitment to
extensions.
In ‘Boole’s Logical Calculus and the Begriffsschrift’, which was submitted
for publication in 1881, we already see Frege starting to make the sort of
distinction between concept and object that characterizes his mature work:
[I]n the concept-script, [designations of properties and relations] never occur on their
own, but always in combinations which express contents of possible judgement. I could
compare this with the behavior of the atom: we suppose an atom never to be found
on its own, but only combined with others, moving out of one combination only in
order immediately to enter into another. A sign for a property never appears without
a thing to which it might belong being at least indicated, a designation of a relation
never without indication of the things which might stand in it. (Frege, 1880–81, 17)
The question Frege is discussing here is how predicates differ from singular
terms, not how concepts differ from objects. Something of his mature view is
nonetheless present in his insistence that a predicate must always appear with
its arguments. But his mature view is not yet present. Less than a year later,
however, we find Frege using much more familiar language in the letter to
Marty:
I regard it as essential for a concept that the question whether something falls under
it have a sense. … A concept is unsaturated in that it requires something to fall under
it; hence it cannot exist on its own. That an individual falls under the concept is a
judgeable content, and here the concept appears as predicative and is always predicative.
In this case, where the subject is an individual, the relation of subject to predicate is
there is nothing whatsoever wrong with Frege’s notation ‘


f(x ; y)’. But there is something
wrong with it.
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not a third thing added to the two,33 but it belongs to the content of the predicate,
which is what makes the predicate unsatisfied. (Frege, 1980, 101)
Frege’s claims in ‘Boole’s Logical Calculus’ had concerned expressions, but
now those claims have been transformed into metaphysical theses about the
denotations of those expressions:The earlier claim that “designations [of prop-
erties] never occur on their own” has become the claim that a concept “cannot
exist on its own”.34 There is a corresponding difference concerning how Frege
argues for these claims. Frege had derived the linguistic thesis that “[a] sign
for a property never appears without a thing to which it might belong being at
least indicated” from an epistemological thesis: that ideas of properties are not
“formed apart from objects [but] arise simultaneously with the first judgement
in which they are ascribed to things” (Frege, 1880–81, 17). By contrast, the
metaphysical thesis that a concept “cannot exist on its own” is derived from
another metaphysical thesis: that concepts are unsaturated, that is, essentially
predicative.
Now, as noted above, once an absolute distinction between concept and
object is in place, the hierarchy of levels of functions is also required. This
distinction is in place no later than 1884: Frege explicitly distinguishes first-
from second-level concepts in Die Grundlagen, including existence and “one-
ness” among the latter (Frege, 1884, §53). Indeed, there is good evidence that
the distinction between levels was already in place by 1882. Frege goes on to
say, in Die Grundlagen, that “[b]ecause existence is a property of concepts the
ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down” (Frege, 1884,
§53). And Frege mentions in the letter to Marty that “Kant’s refutation of the
ontological argument becomes very obvious when presented in my way…”
(Frege, 1980, 102).
Indeed, Frege was so taken with the notion of unsaturatedness, and the
sharp distinction between concept and object that it requires, that he lists the
injunction “never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object”
as one of the “three fundamental principles” that shape his investigations in
Die Grundlagen (Frege, 1884, x). By contrast, though Frege does use exten-
sions of concepts to define the concept of number in Die Grundlagen, he does
not yet seem to have committed himself to their use, remarking in the closing
sections of the book: “I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the
extensions of concepts at all” (Frege, 1884, §107). So I suspect that there was
33The other case Frege has in mind is when the grammatical subject is a predicate, as in ‘Whales
are mammals’. In that case, the relation of subject to predicate is “a third thing added to the two”,
namely, what Frege called ‘subsumption’ and represents as a generalized conditional. May and I
discuss elsewhere exactly what this means (Heck and May, 2013, §3).
34Frege is also more insistent here about the incompleteness of expressions themselves. He
writes a few sentences later: “In general I represent the falling of an individual under a concept
by F (x), where x is the subject (argument) and F ( ) the predicate (function)” (Frege, 1980,
101). Note the use of the notation ‘F ( )’, where the function’s argument-place—and so its
incompleteness—is clearly indicated. No such notation is found in any of the extant writings
before 1882.
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a stage at which Frege treated the ancestral as a higher-level function, rather
than reducing it to a function on extensions.
There is yet further evidence for this view in Grundgesetze itself. In §31,
Frege argues that the stipulations he has made earlier in Part I about the ref-
erences of his primitive signs really do suffice to secure a reference for each of
them.35 Frege helpfully lists the signs to be discussed and includes a second-
order quantifier over binary functions:
f (f(; ))
only then to note that it “may remain out of consideration since it will not be
made use of” (Grundgesetze I, §31). And, indeed, it is not used anywhere in
Grundgesetze.36 But if this quantifier is never used, why does Frege bother to
mention it?
The obvious guess is that Frege once needed this sort of quantifier. And
the obvious reason he would have needed it is because of how equinumeros-
ity is defined in Die Grundlagen: The concept F is equinumerous with the
conceptG iff there is a relation that correlates them one-to-one (Frege, 1884,
§§71–2). In Grundgesetze, on the other hand, equinumerosity is understood
not as a relation between concepts but as one between extensions of concepts
(i.e., value-ranges), and its definition quantifies not over relations but over ex-
tensions of relations (i.e., double value-ranges).37 The fact that Frege mentions
the relation quantifier suggests to me, therefore, that the wholesale replace-
ment of higher-level functions by first-level functions was a late development,
possibly even post-dating the commitment to value-ranges.38
18.5 EXTENSIONS
As we have just noted, many of the notions one might have expected Frege
to treat as higher-level functions in Grundgesetze—functionality, the ancestral,
and equinumerosity, to name just a few—are not so treated there. But there are
some higher-level concepts that are important to Frege’s mature logical theory.
Among these, of course, are the quantifiers. The other, and in some ways the
most important, is the “smooth breathing”, fromwhich names of value-ranges
are formed:The name of the value-range of the function f is ‘"f(")’, and here
‘"’ is a variable bound by the smooth breathing:. So ‘"'(")’ is an expression
35I have discussed the details of Frege’s argument elsewhere (Heck, 1998; 2012, chs. 2–4).
36This symbol is also mentioned in §24, when Frege makes his official stipulation concerning
the reference of the second-order quantifier, and that stipulation applies both to the quantifier
over unary functions and to this quantifier over binary functions.
37More precisely, the definition of mapping (Grundgesetze I, §38) quantifies over extensions of
relations.
38The fact that Frege mentions pairs in the 1889 manuscript, however, suggests that he was
reducing second- to first-level functions by that time: That’s exactly what pairs are needed to do,
for the case of binary functions, if you do not yet have the double value-range construction.
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that denotes a second-level function from first-level functions to objects: their
value-ranges. Similar remarks could be made about the notation ‘x^F (x)’ used
above.
Now, as I noted earlier, Frege does not seem to have committed himself to
the use of extensions until 1884—and then only tentatively—and we do not
find Frege making use of extensions in any of his discussions of formal logic
before that date. That is not just true of Begriffsschrift but also of the various
bits and pieces of semi-formal argument one finds in the various papers that
Frege wrote in the early 1880s, comparing his logic to Boole’s (Frege, 1879b,
1880–81, 1882a,b,c). Still, Frege might yet have been experimenting, at least,
with extensions at that time. So it seems worth asking how he might have
formalized talk of extensions before the appearance of the distinction between
concept and object, since second-level expressions like ‘"(")’ and ‘x^F (x)’
would not then have been available.
A hint is found in the fragment ‘Comments on Sense and Reference’,
which was written in about 1892:39
[I]n any sentence, we can substitute salva veritate one concept-word for another if they
have the same extension … Of course, the thought will alter when such replacements
are made, but this is the sense of the sentence, not its reference.The reference, which is
the truth-value, remains the same. For this reason we might easily come to propose the
extension of a concept as the reference of a concept-word; to do this, however, would
be to overlook the fact that the extensions of concepts are objects and not concepts.
(Frege, 1892–95, 118–9)
To appreciate the significance of this remark, one needs to understand how
often such comments reflect Frege’s own changes of mind. A striking example
is the famous footnote from Die Grundlagen mentioned earlier. The objection
“that concepts can have identical extensions without themselves coinciding”
(Frege, 1884, §68, fn. 1) is not just natural but, as we have seen, one Frege
himself would have wanted to lodge just a few years previously. But Frege
does not own up to his change of mind in that footnote.
Similarly, I suspect that, when Frege says that “we might easily come to
propose the extension of a concept as the meaning of a concept-word”, what
he actually means is: I once fell into this trap myself.40 But it was a useful
trap. If concept-words “mean” their extensions, then Frege could have made
reference to extensions without making use of a second-level function-symbol
like the smooth breathing. That the extension of the concept F fell under the
concept G, for example, could have been given the wholly natural symboliz-
ation: G(F ). The mature Frege would have regarded this kind of symboliza-
tion as incoherent: Functions are unsaturated; a predicate must always occur
with its argument-places; etc, etc. But these are views that were not in place
when Frege wrote Begriffsschrift. There does not appear to be any ground there
39I have changed the translation of ‘Bedeutung’ from ‘meaning’ to ‘reference’.
40This is also the view of the Booleans, who thought of predicates as denoting classes.
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for objecting to ‘G(F )’. The idea, then, would be that “bare” occurrences of
function-letters might once have been taken to refer to extensions.
To be sure, it is not obvious how to generalize this proposal. The number
zero, as Frege defines it, is the extension of the concept: equinumerous with the
concept non-self-identical. So consider for a moment how might we formalize
the statement that the extension of the concept non-self-identical falls under
the concept G. Part of the problem is that we have no primitive symbol for
inequality. It obviously will not do to write: G(: =). But even if we did have
such a symbol, it would not do either to write: G( 6=). Such a symbolism is
incapable of recording all the distinctions we should wish to make: It is either
wildly ambiguous or expressively impoverished. Consider, for example, the
extensions of these two concepts:
 being the extension of the concept is self-identical
 being the extension of the concept is its own singleton
These two concepts are denoted, in Grundgesetze, by  = "(" = ") and  =
"(" = ), respectively, so that the extensions themselves are denoted by ( =
"(" = ")) and ( = "(" = )). But if the only way to refer to extensions is
by using bare occurrences of function-letters, then both of these get written:
= (=).
It should be clear, from a moment’s reflection, that the problem here is one
of scope and binding. It is, in fact, a problem of much the same sort as the
one for which Frege introduces small Greek letters in Begriffsschrift: ‘I"f(; ")’
versus ‘I"f("; )’. And Frege could have used the same sort of notation to
resolve the ambiguities we have just been discussing. It would not do simply
to write ‘ = (" = )’ as a name of the extension of the concept is its own
singleton, for it needs to be made clear what the scope of ‘’ and ‘"’ are and, in
particular, what scopes they take with respect to one another: ( = "(" = "))
is not the same as "( = (" = ")). But if all we need to do is find a way to
indicate their scope, then that is easy enough to do: [ = ("" = )], which
is of course different from ("[ = (" = )]), and in just the right way.
One might object that this notation is an inessential variant of the nota-
tion Frege uses in Grundgesetze, and there is undoubtedly a sense in which
that is true. Indeed, that is the point. The crucial question is not what nota-
tion Frege used but how Frege understood that notation. In Grundgesetze, the
smooth breathing is a second-level function-symbol, and the variable it binds
serves to fill the argument-place of the functional-expression that occurs in
the smooth breathing’s own argument-place. The Greek letters that occur as
subscripts in [ = ("" = )], however, serve no such purpose. They just dis-
ambiguate an otherwise ambiguous expression by indicating what predicate
occurs within the parentheses. In particular, ‘("f")’ is nothing more than a
complicated way of writing the function-symbol ‘f ’, not something new or
different. And if so, then ‘("f")a’ is just a more complicated way of writing
‘fa’. So the “conversion rule”
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("f")a  fa
looks to be analytic, that is, a truth of logic. And it is close enough to naïve
abstraction that it should be clear enough what kind of work it could be made
to do, both positively and negatively speaking.41
The contrast between ‘("f")’ and ‘"(f")’ may seem over-drawn. In fact,
however, it corresponds to a major shift in Frege’s understanding of his lo-
gic. In his mature period, Frege regards the quantifiers as function-symbols
(Grundgesetze I, §31). The first-order quantifier, for example, denotes a func-
tion from first-order concepts to truth-values and so is itself a second-level
function-symbol whose denotation is a second-level concept. But that view
is wholly absent from Begriffsschrift, in which the purpose of the “concavity”
is conceived very differently. The concavity does not express generality in Be-
griffsschrift but simply “delimits the scope that the generality indicated by the
letter covers” (Frege, 1879a, §11, my emphasis). Frege is very explicit about
the emphasized point:
The signs customarily employed in the general theory of magnitudes are of two kinds.
The first consists of letters, of which each represents either a number left indeterminate
or a function left indeterminate. This indeterminacy makes it possible to use letters to
express the universal validity of propositions, as in
(a+ b)c = ac+ bc
The other kind consists of signs such as +,  , p, 0, 1, and 2, of which each has its
particular meaning.
I adopt this basic idea of distinguishing two kinds of signs…in order to apply it in
the more comprehensive domain of pure thought in general. I therefore divide all signs
that I use into those by which we may understand different objects and those that have
a completely determinate meaning. The former are letters and they will serve chiefly to
express generality. (Frege, 1879a, §1, emphasis in original)
The way Frege is using emphasis in this passage is consistent throughout Be-
griffsschrift: He uses it when stating the fundamental features of his new con-
ception of logic. The idea that generality is expressed by letters is one of those
features.
Gary Kemp (1995, 46, n. 12) has also noted that Frege holds this view
in Begriffsschrift. Unfortunately, however, Kemp seems to read this same view
into Grundgesetze.42 By then, however, Frege has changed his mind. His ma-
41One might think that we have the materials here for a very different interpretation of the
footnote to §68 of Die Grundlagen. In particular, one might suggest that Frege’s claim that ‘the
concept’ and ‘the extension of the concept’ are interchangable reflects the sort of view we have
been exploring. But, by that time, the distinction between concept and object is in full force, so
that cannot be right. Still, this might help explain why Frege says what he does in that footnote,
that is, how he came to the strange view that ‘the concept F ’ does not denote a concept.
42Kemp is primarily concerned with the use of Roman letters in Grundgesetze, which are what
look to a modern eye like free variables. Their status remains a matter of some controversy. Most
interpreters have supposed them to be tacitly bound by initial universal quantifiers. My own
view is that this interpretation is wrong, and that Frege’s understanding of Roman letters, though
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ture view is closer to the modern view, which of course he inspired:43 Gen-
erality is expressed by the concavity, which has as its reference a particular
second-level function, the one under which a concept falls just in case it maps
every argument to the True; the letters are merely bound variables, and they
denote nothing but only “indicate”. Moreover, universal and existential quan-
tification are, on Frege’s mature view, equals. They are both second-level con-
cepts, and neither is, in principle, more fundamental than the other, though
in practice one might take one as primitive and treat the other as defined, as
Frege does. By constrast, Frege’s view in Begriffsschrift is that universal gener-
ality is fundamental: Letters of themselves carry this kind of generality, and no
other. For that reason, there could, in a sense, be no existential quantifier in
Begriffsschrift. One could define an abbreviation for ‘ a ’, but it could only
be an abbreviation. There would be no possibility of treating the existential
quantifier as primitive and the universal as defined.44
I conclude, therefore, that there is no technical obstacle to the proposal
we have been considering: Frege might once simply have regarded “bare” oc-
currences of predicates as denoting extensions. Or, to put it differently, Frege
might once have regarded extensions as just being “concepts viewed as argu-
ments”.
One advantage of this interpretation is that it helps us resolve a long-
standing disagreement about Basic Law V. Frege sometimes seems to suggest
that ‘8x(Fx = Gx)’ and ‘"F" = "G"’ have the very same sense (Frege, 1891,
11), and some commentators have suggested that Frege regarded LawV as ana-
lytic, because he took its two sides to be synonymous.45 For example, Hans
Sluga (1980, 157) claims that “a thought concerning a function is the same
as [the corresponding thought] concerning [its] value-range”. My own view
is that this is certainly false, indeed, that Frege explicitly rejects this view in
Grundgesetze (II, §146; see Heck, 2012, 112ff for discussion). On the other
hand, when Frege says in Die Grundlagen §64 that ‘dir(a) = dir(b)’ simply
“carve[s] up the content in a way different from” how ‘a k b’ does, it is not un-
reasonable to suppose that he is flirting with some such view. But what look
like conflicting interpretations of a single doctrine may instead be accurate
interpretations of doctrines held at different times. In particular, if the sug-
gestions made earlier in this section are correct, then Frege’s original view was
indeed that ‘("f")a’ and ‘fa’ are synonymous, in which case
complex and not sufficiently developed, is much closer to the modern understanding than is
usually supposed (Heck, 2012, §3.2).
43Frege’s idea of treating quantifiers as second-level functions is only properly explored in the
1950s, when Mostowski (1957) initiates the study of generalized quantifiers.
44Russell once supposed that different types of generality were expressed by different kinds of
variables (Russell, 1903, ch. VIII). So, in principle, one could introduce a different type of letter
to express “existential generality”. But that would be a very different idea.
45Stating the view that way is a bit sloppy, since the two sides of Law V do not express thoughts.
Only the two sides of its closed instances express thoughts. Whether there is a serious worry here
is not so clear, however.
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("f")a  fa
is certainly analytic. If that is so, then
8x[("f")x  ("g")x]  8x(fx  gx)
is presumably analytic, too. And now it is easy enough to see how we might
talk ourselves into thinking that
("f") = ("g")  8x(fx  gx)
must be analytic, as well. One direction can even be proven: If ("f") = ("g"),
then, by Leibniz’s Law, or something close enough, ("f")x  ("g")x, which
implies 8x[("f")x  ("g")x], and conversion then gives us 8x(fx  gx).
The converse would need some other justification, but one might reasonably
suppose that
8x[("f")x  ("g")x]! ("f") = ("g")
simply expresses the extensionality of extensions, and the antecedent follows
from 8x(fx  gx) and the conversion rule.
Let me emphasize, however, that this entire train of thought depends cru-
cially upon Frege’s original understanding of the role of small Greek letters. In
particular, ‘("f")a’ and ‘fa’ will have the same logical structure only so long
as ‘("f")’ is just a funny way of writing ‘f ’. Since ‘"(f")’ is in no sense a funny
way of writing ‘f’, ‘aS"(f")’ does not have the same logical structure as ‘fa’,
and so the two cannot have the same sense (Heck and May, 2010, §5). That is
why Frege does not attempt to justify Law V, in his mature work, in anything
like the way I have just described.
18.6 NUMERICAL EQUALITY
Another of the important changes to his logical theory that Frege mentions in
Grundgesetze is his adoption of the view that arithmetical equality is simply
identity. In Begriffsschrift, Frege had held the opposite view. That is, he there
regarded the sign ‘=’, as it is used in arithmetic, as denoting a relation that
was not identity but something weaker. Identity of content was symbolized
by ‘’. Thus, it seems, Frege would have regarded ‘2 + 2 = 4’ as true, but
‘2 + 2  4’ as false. Now, as May (2001) has argued, this view did not last
very long. Frege has obviously abandoned it by Die Grundlagen, since the
proposal he considers in §§62ff clearly treats arithmetical equality as identity.
But what exactly was Frege’s earlier view? What could arithmetical equality
have been if not identity?
The answer, I think, is implicit in Die Grundlagen. The word that is now
usually translated as ‘equinumerous’46 is ‘gleichzahlig ’, which more literally
46Austin, of course, translates it as ‘equal’.
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means something like: numerically equal (cf. Parsons, 1995, 186). And Frege
writes in §63: “This opinion, that the equality of numbers must be defined in
terms of one–one correlation, seems in recent years to have gained widespread
acceptance among mathematicians”.47 The thought, then, is that numerical
equality just was equinumerosity. And if that is right, then what were supposed
to stand in the relation of numerical equality were not numbers but concepts
or, perhaps, their extensions.
This sort of idea can be developed smoothly within higher-order logic.
We can define a relation Eqx(Fx;Gx) between concepts in terms of one–
one correspondence, and then define the numbers themselves as second-level
concepts:
0x(Fx)
df:9x(Fx)
1x(Fx)
df9x(Fx ^ 0y(Fy ^ x 6= y))
2x(Fx)
df9x(Fx ^ 1y(Fy ^ x 6= y))
Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere (Heck, 2011c), we can then define higher-
order analogues of the notions of predecession and natural number and prove
versions of all of the Dedekind–Peano axioms except one, namely, the exist-
ence of successors. That will not be provable without an axiom of infinity.
Indeed, we will not even be able to prove the distinctness of two and three:
:8F (2x(Fx)  3x(Fx))
without the assumption that there are at least two objects.
As we have just seen, however, Frege did not distinguish first- and second-
level concepts in his earliest work.The sort of approach just sketched therefore
would not have been available to him, not in quite that form. But the ideas
developed in the last section could be put to use here, too. We could regard
numerical equality as a relation between extensions of concepts, but think of
extensions as what bare occurrences of predicates mean.That is, we could give
a definition like:
F  G  9R[: : : ]
where the right-hand side, of course, is any of the usual formulas that define
one–one correspondence. The key difference between this approach and the
higher-order one is that, now, the things that stand in the relation of numer-
ical equality, or Gleichzahligkeit, are, roughly speaking, objects: extensions of
concepts. That is not quite the right way to put it, since there really is no dis-
tinction between objects and concepts in Begriffsschrift. So perhaps we should
47What I have translated as ‘the equality of numbers’ Austin translates as ‘numerical equality
or identity’, but no reference to identity is made here: Frege’s German is simply ‘die Gleichheit der
Zahlen’, which is the obvious inspiration for ‘gleichzahlig ’.
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just say that the expressions that flank the symbol for numerical equality are
“arguments” rather than “functions”, terms rather than predicates.
Thismakes an important difference.The definitions of the individual num-
bers could be given in the same way as above:
0(F )
df:9x(Fx)
1(F )
df9x(Fx ^ 0(yFy ! x = y))
2(F )
df9x(Fx ^ 1(yFy ^ x 6= y))
So the numbers appear again as concepts, though this time as concepts under
which extensions fall. But the definitions could also be given in a different
way:
0(F )
dfF  ("" 6= ")
1(F )
dfF  ("" = 0)
2(F )
dfF  ("" = 0 _ " = 1)
And now we can prove such things as
:2([ = ("" 6= ")])
and so will also be able to prove things like
:8F (2(F )  3(F )) (18.1)
Moreover, given the obvious parallels between this sort of system and the
formal theory of Grundgesetze, it seems plausible that something like Frege’s
proof of the existence of successors could be carried out in this framework,
though I hasten to add that I have not actually tried to carry it out. (Exercise!)
Whether Frege ever held such a view we shall probably never know, unless
the Nachlass should be rediscovered. But the hypothesis that he did explains
a great deal, for example, why so-called “abstraction principles” should have
been so central to Frege’s philosophy of mathematics.48 On this account, Frege
originally understood HP (Hume’s Principle) as a definition not of numerical
identity but of the distinct notion of numerical equality, which he understood
48It might also help us understand better Frege’s discussion of the “inductive” definition of
number in §§55ff of Die Grundlagen. To what extent do his objections to that definition depend
upon the distinction between concept and object? My initial thought is that they depend upon
that distinction quite a bit. What matters most to Frege is that the definitions do not allow us
“to pick out the 0 and 1 as self-subsistent objects”. I have suggested elsewhere, too (Heck, 2011c,
143–4), that, if Caesar can be both an object and a function, then Caesar(F ) might just mean:
F (Caesar), and then it is easy to understand why we might wonder whether Caesar is a number,
if numbers are just certain properties of concepts.
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as a relation between concepts (or their extensions, which he didn’t quite dis-
tinguish).
This general approach could have survived Frege’s convincing himself that
numerical equality was really just identity. The finite numbers, after all, are
defined as concepts, and concepts either have extensions or, when seen as ar-
guments, just are extensions. So, from (18.1) above, we can infer:
(F 2(F )) 6= (F 3(F ))
or, to put it a different way: 2 6= 3, where this is understood asmeaning that the
(extension of the) concept 2 is not the same as the (extension of the) concept
3. And what is the extension of the concept 2? It is precisely the number 2, as
it is defined in Die Grundlagen: The concept 2 is true of F just in case F is
true of exactly two things, so its extension contains all and only those concepts
that are true of exactly two things.
This approach could not, however, have survived the introduction of a
sharp distinction between concept and object: It rests upon our conflating the
two. But it is not particularly difficult to refashion these ideas to get something
that will work.We need do littlemore than re-interpret expressions of the form
‘(": : : " : : : )’ as terms referring to extensions. The result would be something
close, both in spirit and in detail, to the construction inGrundgesetze. Still, it is
easy enough to imagine why Fregemight have wanted to explore an alternative.
If extensions are not just concepts viewed as arguments, then what exactly is
the relation between a concept and its extension? And how is the existence of
extensions to be secured?
And there is an alternative worth exploring: Re-interpret the explicit defini-
tion of numerical equality, which would now be regarded as defining a relation
between concepts, as a contextual definition of numerical identity, which is a
relation between objects.
18.7 HP AND THE EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF NUMBER
George Boolos once remarked—I believe this was in 1995—that there is some-
thing very strange about how Die Grundlagen unfolds.49 The first sixty-odd
sections of the book seem to drive relentlessly in the direction of the view that
the sense of the expression ‘the number belonging to the concept F ’ can be
fixed by “defin[ing] the sense of a proposition in which a number word oc-
curs” (Frege, 1884, §62). Frege then focuses attention on identity-statements
involving such expressions and proposes in §63 to define them by means of
HP: The number of F s is the same as the number of Gs iff the F s are in one–
one correspodence with the Gs. In the next two sections, Frege raises and
refutes two objections to this view. In §66, he brings a third, and very odd,
49Peter Geach (1955, 569) insists very strongly that Frege’s views about arithmetic are utterly
independent of any commitment to extensions, but he does not make quite this observation.
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objection against it, the so-called Caesar objection: HP fails to decide whether
Caesar is a number and, if so, which one he is. Frege upholds this objection in
§67—something Dummett (1991, 127) describes, with characteristic English
understatement, as coming “to the reader’s surprise”—and then offers a quick
patch in §68: the explicit definition of numbers as equivalence classes. Frege
then explains in §§70–2 how to make the notion of equinumerosity rigorous
and in §73 recovers HP from the explicit definition, which is never heard of
again.
So much is now old news. What Boolos observed, however, was that
the discussion and resolution of the Caesar objection is so independent of
everything else that happens in Die Grundlagen that the book’s intelligibility
would suffer hardly at all were §§66–9 and §73 simply deleted. To be sure,
a handful of minor changes would have to be made elsewhere, but that is all.
Boolos was thus inclined to suppose that Frege’s intention, when he began
writing Die Grundlagen, and even for most of the time he was composing it,
was to define numbers not explicitly but contextually, by means of HP, and
then to derive axioms for arithmetic from HP in pure second-order logic. At
some point late in the process, however—perhaps under the influence of the
Caesar objection, perhaps for some other reason he does not mention—Frege
changed his mind and decided to define numbers explicitly, patching the ma-
nuscript with the mentioned material.
This hypothesis obviously fits well with developments in our understand-
ing of Frege’s philosophy of mathematics to which Boolos contribued a great
deal. Not only can axioms for arithmetic be derived from HP in second-order
logic, but it is now widely accepted that Frege himself knew as much. Among
the evidence is the fact that Frege’s proofs of the axioms in Die Grundlagen do
not even appear to depend upon the explicit definition. Moreover, as I have
argued elsewhere, the proofs in Grundgesetze, although they do make use of
value-ranges, make no essential use of them and can easily, and uniformly, be
transformed into derivations from HP that largely parallel the proofs in Die
Grundlagen (Heck, 2012, Part II).50 And Frege himself seems to suggest, in a
letter to Russell, that one way he could respond to Russell’s discovery of the
contradiction would be to abandon Basic Law V and retreat to HP (Frege,
1980, 121). Frege does not pursue the idea, since he thinks HP has problems
related to those that, even before the discovery of the contradiction, afflic-
ted Law V.51 But the suggestion would make no sense at all if Frege thought
value-ranges were needed not just for the proof of HP but for the proofs of
the axioms of arithmetic from HP.
50I say “largely” because Frege’s proof of the existence of successors in Die Grundlagen turns out
to have been invalid (Boolos andHeck, 2011; Heck, 2012, §6.7).The proof given inGrundgesetze
is closely related to the earlier proof, however, and Frege there explains how that proof can be
repaired (Grundgesetze I, §114).
51I take those problems to be related to the Caesar problem (Heck, 2011b).
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One would, of course, like more direct textual evidence for Boolos’s hypo-
thesis about the composition of Die Grundlagen. But there is some.
The first comes from reflecting on an otherwise odd aspect of how Frege
explains his notion of analyticity early in the book:
The problem [of determining whether a proposition is analytic] becomes … that of
finding the proof of the proposition, and of following it up right back to the primit-
ive truths. If, in carrying out this process, we come only on general logical laws and
on definitions, then the truth is an analytic one, bearing in mind that we must take
account also of all propositions upon which the admissibility of any of the definitions
depends. (Frege, 1884, §3)
Focus on that last clause. What does Frege mean when he speaks of “propos-
itions upon which the admissibility of any of the definitions depends”? The
remark is particularly striking since Frege later came to regard only explicit,
abbreviative definitions as legitimate (Grundgesetze II, §66). Such definitions
have no presuppositions. Here, by contrast, Frege is intimating that there are
legitimate forms of definition that do have such presuppositions. What sorts
of definitions might those be?
In §65 of Die Grundlagen, Frege considers the possibility of defining ‘the
direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b’ so that it means the
same as ‘line a is parallel to line b’.52 He then raises the question whether “we
are not liable, through using such methods, to become involved in conflict
with the well-known laws of identity”. After explaining what he means by
identity, Frege continues:
Now, it is actually the case that in universal substitutability all the laws of identity
are contained. In order, therefore, to justify our proposed definition of the direction
of a line, we should have to show that it is possible, if line a is parallel to line b, to
substitute “the direction of line a” everywhere for “the direction of line b”. This task is
made simpler by the fact that we are being taken initially to know of nothing that can
be asserted about the direction of a line except the one thing, that it coincides with
the direction of some other line. We should thus have to show only that substitution
was possible in an identity of this one type, or in judgement-contents containing such
identities as constituent elements. (Frege, 1884, §65)
Frege does not say how this could be done, but of course we know: It is enough
to show that parallelism is an equivalence relation.
This, then, is precisely the sort of case Frege has in mind in §3:53 If we were
to define direction in terms of parallelism, as is proposed at the beginning of
§65, then that defintion would have a presupposition, namely, that parallelism
52Frege calls this both a “Definition” and an “Erklärung”, and he uses the two terms inter-
changeably in his discussion of it. It is the former that is used in the passage from §3 that we are
discussing, both times.
53Dummett (1991, 57) elsewhere suggests that Frege might also have had recursive definitions
in mind, and something close to the recursive definition of addition is mentioned in Die Grund-
lagen, at §6. But Frege’s discussion there makes it clear that, even at that time, he did not regard
recursive “definition” as a legitimate form of definition. So that cannot be the sort of definition
Frege has in mind in §3: one that is legitimate, and yet has presuppositions.
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is an equivalence relation. And the same, of course, goes for the case that really
matters to Frege: If we were to use HP to define number in terms of equinu-
merosity, as was proposed in §63, then that too would have a presupposition,
namely, that equinumerosity is an equivalence relation. So, if we do so think
of HP as a definition, then whether various propositions that are proven from
it are analytic—e.g., that every natural number has a successor—will depend
not just upon the proofs of those propositions themselves, but also upon how
the proposition that equinumerosity is an equivalence relation can be proven,
since HP would not be a legitimate definition were that not so.
Dummett, from whom I learned all of that as a graduate student, puts it
this way:
When he wrote Die Grundlagen, Frege plainly had not yet developed any objection
to definitions whose justifiability depends on the proof of some proposition: he had
spoken equably of such a possibility in §3. (Dummett, 1991, 126)
[In particular,] it is necessary if the contextual definition of the direction-operator is
to be justified [that parallelism be shown to be an equivalence relation]: the demon-
stration is one of those securing the legitimacy of a definition of which Frege had
spoken in §3. By analogy, the proposed contextual definition of the cardinality op-
erator would need to be justified by showing [equinumerosity] to be an equivalence
relation of second-level… (Dummett, 1991, 128–9)
So the sort of definition Frege had in mind in §3 was precisely the “very odd
kind of definition” (Frege, 1884, §63) that he discusses in §§62–7 of the book.
The lesson of our reflections is thus that the definition of analyticity at
the beginning of Die Grundlagen—the definition that sets the terms of the
investigation that follows—is carefully formulated to allow for the possibility
that some of the definitions needed to establish the analyticity of arithmetic
will be not explicit but contextual. It is hard to see why Frege would state the
defintion that way if he had not intended to use such definitions himself—
which would also be why he says that “logicians have not yet paid enough
attention” (Frege, 1884, §63, my emphasis) to such definitions.
Themost impressive evidence in favor of Boolos’s proposal comes, however,
from §§92–104 of Die Grundlagen. Frege there considers how his work on
cardinal numbers might be extended to incorporate other sorts of numbers,
especially the complex numbers, which were the central focus of Frege’s non-
foundational work and were what, in many ways, gave rise to his interest in
the philosophy of mathematics (Tappenden, 1995;Wilson, 1995). As we shall
see, Frege mentions these sections both in his initial sketch of the book (Frege,
1884, x) and in his summary of its results (Frege, 1884, §109). That suggests
that they were far more important to Frege than the little attention that has
been paid to them by later commentators would lead one to suppose.
Frege begins by making now familiar criticisms of formalist and postula-
tionist theories of the complex numbers (Frege, 1884, §§92–9).54 He then
54It does not seem to be widely appreciated how similar these are to the better-known criticisms
of formalism Frege makes in Grundgesetze (II, §§86–137) .
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turns to the proposal that we should identify the imaginary number i with
some object already given, say, the Moon, or a fixed interval of time. But
Frege finds such proposals wanting. There are technical problems—it’s not
clear how to define a + bi (Frege, 1884, §§100–2)—but there is a deeper
worry: The existence of complex numbers would then depend upon the exist-
ence of theMoon, or of intervals of time, and so “[p]ropositions proved by the
aid of complex numbers would become a posteriori judgements, or rather, at
any rate, synthetic…” (Frege, 1884, §103). A more promising proposal, tech-
nically speaking, is to represent complex numbers geometrically—as common
a technique then as it is now—but that doesn’t help with the epistemological
worry, since it “seems to make every theorem whose proof has to be based
upon the existence of a complex number dependent on geometrical intuition
and so synthetic” (Frege, 1884, §103).
And so it is that Frege asks: “How then are complex numbers to be given
to us, and fractions and irrational numbers?” Frege quickly sketches how the
foundation he has provided for arithmetic can be used to secure the claim
that 100010001000 exists, even though “it is impossible for us ever to become
conscious of that many objects…”. He then writes:
Similarly, with the definitions of fractions, complex numbers, and so forth, everything
will in the end come down to the search for a judgement-content that can be trans-
formed into an identity whose sides are precisely the new numbers. In other words,
what we must do is fix the sense of a recognition-judgement for the case of these num-
bers. (Frege, 1884, §104)
It needs no emphasis how closely Frege’s discussion here parallels that in §62.
The question that opens §104 is obviously intended to echo the famous ques-
tion that opens §62: “How, then, are [cardinal] numbers to be given to us,
if we cannot have any ideas or intuitions of them?” And Frege’s preliminary
answer to that question in §62 is explicitly the model for the answer he gives
to the corresponding question in §104. Frege does add that “we must not for-
get the doubts … discussed in §§63–68”, especially the Caesar problem, and
that, if we respond similarly in this case, “then the new numbers are given to
us as extensions of concepts” (Frege, 1884, §104). But it is nonetheless obvi-
ous what program Frege is proposing: All of the objects of arithmetic, broadly
understood, are to be constructed on the basis of “recognition-judgements”.
As noted, Frege does insist that we not ignore the Caesar problem, but
he just as quickly brushes it aside. It is remarkable, moreover, that Frege has
nothing at all to say about what extensions are, twice remarking that he is
simply assuming that it is understood what they are (Frege, 1884, §68, fn. 1,
and §107).The reason is that, although Frege has chosen to resolve the Caesar
problem by means of an explicit definition of numbers as extensions, he does
not yet regard himself as committed to that solution: “[M]any will prefer other
methods of removing the doubt in question,” he writes in his summary of his
results. “I attach no decisive importance even to bringing in the extensions of
concepts at all” (Frege, 1884, §107). Frege thus appears to have regarded the
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particular explicit definition he gives as doubly optional:The use of extensions
in that definition is optional, and the use of an explicit definition is optional.
Recognition-judgements are what matter.
Frege describes his foundational program in two other places inDie Grund-
lagen. On neither of these occasions does he evenmention the Caesar problem.
In the Introduction, he writes:
[A] widely-held formalist theory of fractional, negative, etc. numbers is untenable.
How I propose to improve upon it can be no more than indicated in the present work.
With numbers of all these types, as with positive whole numbers, it is a matter of fixing
the sense of an identity. (Frege, 1884, xxii)
And in the final sentences of Die Grundlagen, Frege writes:
Now we, from our previous treatment of the positive whole numbers, have seen that
it is possible to avoid all importation of external things and geometrical intuitions
into arithmetic, without, for all that, falling into the error of the formalists. … [I]t is a
matter of fixing the content of a recognition-judgement. Once suppose this everywhere
accomplished, and numbers of every kind, whether negative, fractional, irrational or
complex, are revealed as no more mysterious than the positive whole numbers, which
in turn are no more actual or more palpable than they are. (Frege, 1884, §109)
It is particularly notable that Frege does not mention extensions as being
among the mathematical objects to which his theory applies.
Moreover, Frege makes it clear in his comments on Philip Jourdain’s ex-
position of his work, published in 1912, that he struggled for some time to
avoid any commitment to extensions:55
Only with difficulty did I resolve to introduce classes (extents of concepts), because the
matter did not appear to me quite secure—and rightly so, as it turned out. The laws
of numbers are to be developed in a purely logical manner. But numbers are objects,
and in logic we have only two objects, in the first place: the two truth-values. Our first
aim, then, was to obtain objects out of concepts, namely, extents of concepts or classes.
By this I was constrained to overcome my resistence and to admit the passage from
concepts to their extents. (Jourdain, 1980, 191, n. 69)
Frege makes similar remarks in a letter to Russell of 28 July 1902:
It seems to me that you want to admit only systems [aggregates] and not classes. I
myself was long reluctant to recognize value-ranges and hence classes; but I saw no
other possibility of placing arithmetic on a logical foundation. But the question is:
How do we apprehend logical objects? And I have found no other answer to it than
this: We apprehend them as extensions of concepts, or more generally, as value-ranges.
(Frege, 1980, 140)
It is hard to imagine that the struggle of which Frege speaks here was over by
1884, though it is of course hard to know for sure.
55It’s hard to know quite how seriously to take the timeline here, but the way Frege talks
does seem to suggest that his commitment to the idea that truth-values are objects pre-dated his
commitment to extensions.
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Boolos’s hypothesis about the composition of Die Grundlagen thus has
much to recommend it. But Tappenden (2005) has argued quite convincingly
that the Caesar problem is more important to Frege’s thought than Boolos’s
suggestion allows. There is a middle ground, however: Both of the reconstruc-
tions of Frege’s earlier development of arithmetic that we distinguished at the
end of Section 18.6might have been live options when Frege wroteDie Grund-
lagen. He was as convinced as he had ever been of the centrality of recognition-
judgements, and he was not yet comfortable committing himself to extensions.
The hope that he might yet base everything upon HP had not yet been aban-
doned, and so the book was written with that hope in mind, even as Frege
was exploring another course.
18.8 CLOSING
It is obviously impossible to draw any definite conclusions from the foregoing.
Much of it, as I warned at the outset, is wildly speculative, though we have at
least broadened our conception of what might have been. Along the way, we
have also learned something about how Frege’s philosophical views evolved.
And that, in itself, teaches us an important lesson.
Time and again, I have emphasized one simple point: that Frege’s views
really did change between Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze, and in absolutely
fundamental ways. Frege’s understanding of the nature of generality under-
went a profound transformation, for example, and there is little more funda-
mental to Frege’s conception of logic than how he understood generality. I
would go much further: Not one of the characteristic doctrines of Frege’s ma-
ture philosophy is present in his earliest work. To be sure, Frege’s views did
not change as often as Russell’s, but they did change, and every bit as funda-
mentally. In particular, Frege’s views had already changed in very significant
ways by the time he wrote Die Grundlagen, and I have suggested that they
were probably in great flux even then, with Frege not yet having settled upon
answers to questions that were absolutely central to his philosophy.
To understand how Frege’s views evolved, then, we must learn to read his
early writings on their own, independently of his later work. We have to stop
assuming that Frege’s corpus is a seamless whole, except for where it obviously
isn’t.56 The benefit of doing so will not just be that it will make it possible
for us to understand how Frege’s mature doctrines developed. It will make it
possible for us to understand the doctrines themselves much better than we
do. We cannot appreciate them properly unless we know who Frege took his
56I have complained about this elsewhere, too (Heck, 2012, 21–2). In most papers written on
Frege, it is easy to find places where the author cites passages from Frege written ten, twenty, even
forty years apart, as if they came from opposite sides of the same page. And I rather doubt that
my own earlier work—prior to 2005, I mean—is an exception, though I’ve not checked carefully.
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opponents to be. And very often, Frege’s unnamed opponent turns out to be
his younger self.57
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